SASSA is making progress against fraud, our study shows

The SRD grant application system has been systematically defrauded. Archive photo: Barbara October

• SASSA has committed to eliminating fraudulent SRD grant applications.
• We checked SASSA’s commitment by analysing a sample of 2,405 fraudulent applications.
• We found that SASSA has made good progress but there are likely still a large number of fraudulent successful grant applications.

On Tuesday, GroundUp reported that the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) will suspend payments of the Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress (SRD) grant to fraudulent beneficiaries.

We decided to investigate how seriously SASSA is addressing the issue. We obtained a sample of 2,400 applications that we know to be fraudulent. They were sent to us by the N4aughtySec Group, a hacker group that emerged after taking public responsibility for an attack on TransUnion and Experian in March 2022. The group claimed to have demanded a ransom of $30-million from each company. In November reports emerged that N4aughtySec had stolen R175-million through SASSA SRD Grants they opened through TymeBank.

In November 2024 N4aughtySec provided GroundUp with its evidence. We could not validate the claim that R175-million was stolen, but were able to isolate a list of 2,405 known fraudulent SASSA SRD Grants and their associated fraudulent phone numbers.

SASSA categorises applications into one of four categories:

• Invalid: The SASSA grant does not exist or the phone number registered to the SASSA grant does not match.
• Awaiting Identity Verification: The SASSA SRD Application has been blocked until the person verifies their identity by facial scan.
• Active Application: These are applications currently active and not marked as fraudulent.
• Awaiting Reapplication: These require people to reapply for the SRD grant.

The results of our analysis are summarised in this table:

Initially, we examined the data in November 2024 to establish a baseline understanding of how fraudulent applications were being managed. We noticed a significant number of these applications remained active or were in the “Awaiting Identity Verification” category, raising questions about SASSA’s ability to handle such cases efficiently.

Note that this is a sample. There are many more fraudulent grants. But assuming this sample is representative – and there is no reason to think it isn’t – it can tell us how much progress SASSA has made.

When we revisited the data on 21 January 2025, we were able to compare the changes that had occurred over the past two months. This comparative analysis allowed us to measure the extent of SASSA’s efforts and determine whether there had been tangible progress identifying and suspending fraudulent grants.

The shifts in the numbers demonstrate that SASSA has made considerable progress, although some fraudulent applications persist.

The number of applications flagged as “Awaiting Identity Verification” more than doubled, indicating that SASSA is actively blocking grants until identity verification is completed.

Active applications dropped by 73%, suggesting an effort to stop known fraudulent grants.

A slight increase in “Invalid” applications (up 4%) further reflects ongoing system adjustments. (The Awaiting Reapplication category has too few entries to reach meaningful conclusions.)

Based on our findings, SASSA has made progress in addressing fraudulent applications. But SASSA needs to continue to improve its processes, detection systems, and ensure that fraudulent cases are resolved swiftly. SASSA also needs to make sure its verification system is up and easy-to-use. At the time of writing it is down.

More about Social Grants

• SASSA to suspend SRD grants where fraud is suspected 21 January 2025
• Over a hundred disabled and elderly people queue outside SASSA in Khayelitsha 21 January 2025
• MPs demand probe into “entire social grant payment system” 16 January 2025

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